| WuW vom 05.03.2010, Heft 03, Seite 256 - 256 |
Georg de Bronett, Brüssel
This article, in the first part, gives an historical overview on formal EU Commission sector inquiries and finds that three periods can be identified. From the late 1960s until the early 1990s - formal sector inquiries were considered to be unnecessary and difficult from the collection of data point of view; from the late 1990s until 2007 - more sophisticated formal ... |
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| WuW vom 05.03.2010, Heft 03, Seite 256 - 256 |
Florian Wagner-von Papp, London
The article considers the pros and cons of the introduction of criminal sanctions in Germany for anticompetitive behaviour other than bid-rigging. It comes down in favour of the criminalisation of all horizontal hardcore cartels. The main argument is that criminal sanctions avoid the principal-agent problem that arises when only undertakings are fined, because ... |
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| WuW vom 05.03.2010, Heft 03, Seite 256 - 257 |
Jens Steger, Köln
This article is primarily concerned with a critical analysis of the handling of conglomerate media mergers under German antitrust law. An example of the complexity of conglomerate media mergers is provided by the prohibition order of the German Federal Cartel Office in the case concerning the merger AxelSpringer/ProSiebenSat.1 which was recently confirmed by the Higher ... |
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| WuW vom 05.02.2010, Heft 02, Seite 140 - 140 |
Daniel Zimmer / Martin Blaschczok, Bonn
The European Commission recently approved an unusually large number of subsidies granted by member states to banks on an often extraordinary scale. Given the impact of the financial crisis on the economy as a whole, the Commission initially chose a flexible approach, allowing it to make decisions quickly subject to eased requirements. Although the ... |
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| WuW vom 05.02.2010, Heft 02, Seite 140 - 140 |
Bernd Meyring, Düsseldorf
The paper discusses two issues raised by the Commission's anti-cartel enforcement policy in recent cases. First, it analyses the concept of single and continuous infringements. Second, it sets out and criticises how the Commission deals with parent liability in cases in which infringements are committed by joint ventures. In both areas, the Commission is opting for ... |
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| WuW vom 05.02.2010, Heft 02, Seite 140 - 140 |
Thilo Klein, London/Frankfurt a.M.
The SSNIP test has established itself in many jurisdictions worldwide as a methodology for market definition analysis. The German Federal Cartel Office has also publicly endorsed the SSNIP test and relied on SSNIP-type arguments in several merger control decisions. However, there are substantial conceptual differences between the SSNIP test and the "needs ... |
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| WuW vom 05.02.2010, Heft 02, Seite 140 - 141 |
Stefan Thomas, Tübingen
Vertical agreements often contain restrictions of competition that can have horizontal effects especially if the parties are at least potential competitors. The German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC) as in force until the 7th ARC amendment in 2005 has always differentiated between horizontal and vertical restraints. However, the amended ARC has aligned the ... |
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| WuW vom 14.01.2010, Heft 01, Seite 4 - 4 |
Karl M. Meessen, Düsseldorf
Following the German federal elections of 27 September 2009, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) concluded an agreement on the program of the new government these parties were about to form. In that "coalition agreement", it was proposed to entrust the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) with the task ... |
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| WuW vom 14.01.2010, Heft 01, Seite 4 - 4 |
Jürgen Kühnen, Düsseldorf
The article discusses changes to the fining provisions applicable to cartel violations following the 7th Amendment of the German Act against Restrainst of Competition ("GWB"). The first part deals with the question of whether the abolition of the additional turnover as the upper limit for the fine also affects its suitability as an independent criterion in ... |
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| WuW vom 14.01.2010, Heft 01, Seite 4 - 5 |
Christian Mayer, Düsseldorf
The enforcement of claims for damages against cartel members has proven difficult for cartel victims. Therefore, the question arises whether customers of cartel members can rescind their respective contract with the cartel member on the grounds of wilful deceit. For this purpose, cartel victims may allege that the cartel member was under an obligation to inform ... |
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| WuW vom 14.01.2010, Heft 01, Seite 5 - 5 |
Achim Wagner, Mannheim
Within the scope of the German Merger Control's time limits and fiction system, a central meaning is attached to the term "Notifying Undertakings": The "Notifying Undertakings" are addressee of the letter informing about the initiation of the main examination proceedings (second phase proceedings), they have to consent to a possible extension of the time limit of ... |
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| WuW vom 04.12.2009, Heft 12, Seite 1234 - 1234 |
Florian Wagner-von Papp, London
The article compares the criminal enforcement of antitrust law in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Germany. The British cartel offence in s 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002 has received widespread attention, which led to the perception that the criminal antitrust enforcement was working effectively in the UK. In contrast, the German ... |
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| WuW vom 04.12.2009, Heft 12, Seite 1234 - 1234 |
Helmut Lecheler, Berlin
Since the liberalisation of the energy sector in 1998, the agreements between energy providers and municipalities regarding royalties ("Konzessionsabgaben") for the use of public ground that is needed for the construction and the operation of grids supplying the end-costumers in the relevant area are subject to antitrust rules. The same applies to agreements ... |
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| WuW vom 04.12.2009, Heft 12, Seite 1234 - 1235 |
Sabine Zigelski, Bonn
After almost 20 years of application of the merger treshold "competitively significant influence" in German law, which enables merger control in cases of share purchases of less than 25%, the practice of the Bundeskartellamt and the courts moves along rather clearly defined lines. The crucial factors are permanent influences of a competitive nature in boards or other ... |
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| WuW vom 05.11.2009, Heft 11, Seite 1116 - 1116 |
Christian Koenig / Kristina Schreiber, Bonn
The calculation of the estimated value is essential for the applicability of the EC-procedures for the award of public contracts. Whether a contracting authority has to open the procedure to award a contract or not is in the end a question of whether the calculated estimated value is above or below the threshold amounts of Article 7 Directive ... |
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| WuW vom 05.11.2009, Heft 11, Seite 1116 - 1116 |
Horst Henschen / Stefan Koch, Frankfurt a.M.
In a recent ruling the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf found that the acquisition of a 13.75% shareholding in a competitor constitutes a notifiable concentration under section 37 (1) No. 4 of the Act against Restraints of Competition even if the acquired voting rights are neither sufficient for a blocking minority under the German Stock ... |
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| WuW vom 05.11.2009, Heft 11, Seite 1117 - 1117 |
Marc Bungenberg, Erlangen/Jena
The article reports in its first part legislative developments, especially the Reform of the German procurement rules in the ARC which entered into force in April 2009 and with further modifications are about to come in the near future in the VOL/A, VOB/A and the german procurement (VgV) as well as the "EU Defence Package". In its second part the article ... |
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| WuW vom 05.11.2009, Heft 11, Seite 1116 - 1117 |
Philipp Werner / Anna Sachse, Brüssel/Berlin
In some instances the parties to a concentration, either wilfully or negligently, omit to notify the concentration prior to its closing, infringing both the filing and the standstill obligation. For various reasons, the parties may later envisage filing a notification ex post. It is unclear how such a filing should be treated under German law. ... |
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| WuW vom 02.10.2009, Heft 10, Seite 1004 - 1004 |
Johannes Dittrich, München
Especially in times of crisis the horizontal cooperation between competitors gain in importance, in particular for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME). As far as such cooperation is subject to the cartel prohibition of Sec. 1 German Antitrust Code (GWB) at all, either Sec. 2 GWB or, in particular, Sec. 3 GWB - a separate provision for SME, not existing under ... |
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| WuW vom 02.10.2009, Heft 10, Seite 1004 - 1004 |
Hannes Rösler, Hamburg
Preventing media enterprises from accumulating power in the market of ideas is an essential objective for keeping media markets open. Starting from the finding that previously separate media markets are merging, the article covers new challenges in German antitrust law arising from the federal Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) and the State Treaty on ... |
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